A New Europe,
A New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New Era. Address by Secretary Baker to the Berlin Press Club at the Steigenberger Hotel. Berlin, 12 December 1989 by Baker, James
Current 
Policy 
No. 1233 
• 
Following is the prepared address 
by Secretary Baker to the Berlin 
Press Club at the Steigenberger 
Hotel in Berlin, December 12, 1989. 
It is a great honor for an American 
to speak at this time in this city. 
For me and for millions of my fellow 
eitizens, Berlin is the crucible of 
half a century of history. 
• Here we have seen clearly 
what elsewhere hid in shadows. 
• Here the ambiguous disclosed 
its true nature. 
• Here we made the choices and 
took the stands that shaped today's 
world. 
In 1945, pictures of a bombed-
out Berlin brought home to us the 
terrible cost of war. 
In 1948, the Soviet Union 
stalked out of the Four Power 
Control Commission and blockaded 
Berlin-the clear declaration of cold 
war. 
In 1953, Berliners staged the 
first popular revolt against Soviet 
tyranny in Eastern Europe~ 
In 1961, the Berlin Wall closed 
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the last escape hatch from the 
prison camp of nations which 
Eastern Europe had become. 
In 1971, the Quadripartite 
Agreement on Berlin epitomized the 
terrible dilemma of detente-the 
proposition that cooperation 
between East and West assumed 
the continued division of this 
continent. 
Then in 1989, the most 
important event-eertainly the 
most dramatic-of the postwar era 
occurred right here in Berlin. 
On November 9, the wall became 
a gateway. Berliners celebrated 
history's largest, happiest family 
reunion. And all of us who watched 
these scenes felt, once again: We 
are all Berliners. 
Once more, images from Berlin 
flashed around the world, images 
that again heralded a new reality. 
This new reality has its roots in 
those older Berlin scenes-the 
scenes ofWest Berlin's dramatic 
postwar reconstruction; the scenes 
of Allied aircraft supplying a 
blockaded city; the scenes of 
American and Soviet tanks facing 
off at Checkpoint Charlie. 
By standing together, in Berlin 
as elsewhere, Western nations 
created the essential preconditions 
for overcoming the division of this 
city, of this nation, and of this 
continent. 
As these recent events have 
unfolded, the Soviet Union has 
shown a remarkable degree of 
realism. And President Gorbachev 
deserves credit for being the first 
Soviet leader to have the courage 
and foresight to permit the lifting of 
repression in Eastern Europe. 
But the real impulse for change 
comes from an altogether different 
source: the peoples of Poland, of 
Hungary, of Czechoslovakia, of 
Bulgaria, and of East Germany. 
They have freed themselves. 
From the Baltic to the Adriatic, 
an irresistible movement has 
gathered force-a movement of, by, 
and for the people. In their 
peaceful urgent multitude, the 
peoples of Eastern Europe have 
held up a mirror to the West and 
have reflected the enduring power 
of our own best values. In the 
words of Thomas Jefferson, the first 
American Secretary of State: 
"Nothing is more certainly written 
in the book of fate than that these 
people are to be free." The changes 
amount to nothing less than a 
peaceful revolution. 
Now, as President Bush stated 
last week, "the task before us is to 
consolidate the fruits of this 
peaceful revolution and provide the 
architecture for continued peaceful 
change." 
The first step is for free men and 
women to create free governments. 
The path may appear difficult, even 
confusing, but we must travel it 
with understanding. For true 
stability requires governments with 
legitimacy, governments that are 
based on the consent of the 
governed. 
The peoples of Eastern Europe 
are trying to build such govern-
ments. Our view, as President 
Bush has told President Gorbachev, 
is that the political and economic 
reforms in the East can enhance 
both long-term stability in Europe 
and the prospects for perestroika. A 
legitimate and stable European 
order will help, not threaten, 
legitimate Soviet interests. An 
illegitimate order will provide no 
order at all. 
Free men and free governments 
are the building blocks of a Europe 
whole and free. But hopes for a 
Europe whole and free are tinged 
with concern by some that a Europe 
undivided may not necessarily be a 
Europe peaceful and prosperous. 
Many of the guideposts that 
brought us securely through four 
sometimes tense and threatening 
decades are now coming down. 
Some of the divisive issues that 
once brought conflict to Europe are 
reemerging. 
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As Europe changes, the 
instruments for Western 
cooperation must adapt. Working 
together, we must design and 
gradually put into place a new 
architecture for a new era. 
This new architecture must have 
a place for old foundations and 
structures that remain valuable--
like NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization]-while recognizing 
that they can also serve new 
collective purposes. The new 
architecture must continue the 
construction of institutions-like 
the EC [European Community]-
that can help draw together the 
West while also serving as an open 
door to the East. And the new 
architecture must build up 
frameworks-like the CSCE 
[Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe] process-
that can overcome the division of 
Europe and bridge the Atlantic 
Ocean. 
This new structure must also 
accomplish two special purposes. 
First, as a part of overcoming 
the division of Europe, there must 
be an opportunity to overcome, 
through peace and freedom, the 
division of Berlin and of Germany. 
The United States and NATO have 
stood for unification for 40 years, 
and we will not waver from that 
goal. 
Second, the architecture should 
reflect that America's security-
politically, militarily, and econo-
mically-remains linked to Europe's 
security. The United States and 
Canada share Europe's neighbor-
hood. 
As President Bush stated in 
May: "The United States is and will 
remain a European power." And as 
he added. last week: "The U.S. will 
maintain significant military forces 
in Europe as long as our Allies 
desire our presence as part of a 
common security effort." This is our 
commitment to a common future, a 
recognition of a need for an active 
U.S. role in Europe, a need even 
acknowledged by President 
Gorbachev. 
The charge for us all, then, is to 
work together toward the New 
Europe and the New Atlanticism. 
New Missions for NATO 
In May of this year, President Bush 
suggested to his NATO colleagues 
that it was time to begin consider-
ing new missions for NATO. 
For over 40 years, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization has 
secured peace in Europe through 
both deterrence and dialogue with 
the East. Today, NATO is working 
in Vienna to build a new security 
structure for Europe, one in which 
the military component is reduced 
and the political is enhanced. This 
is NATO's first new mission. 
A conventional forces agreement 
is the keystone of this new security 
structure. In May, NATO adopted 
President Bush's suggestion to seek 
such an agreement on an 
accelerated timetable. President 
Gorbachev has responded to this 
opportunity positively. And we 
have moved significantly closer to 
concluding an agreement limiting 
conventional armaments from the 
Atlantic to the Urals. In Malta, 
President Bush proposed a summit 
meeting to sign such an agreement 
in 1990. 
Today, I further propose that the 
ministers of the 23 NATO and 
Warsaw Pact nations take advan-
tage of our February meeting in 
Ottawa, where we will launch the 
"open skies" negotiations, to review 
the status and give a further push 
to the Vienna talks on conventional 
Forces. 
As we construct a new security 
architecture that maintains the 
common defense, the nonmilitary 
component of European security 
will grow. Arms control agree-
ments, confidence-building 
measures, and other political 
consultative arrangements will 
become more important. In such a 
world, the role of NATO will evolve. 
NATO will become the forum where 
Western nations cooperate to 
negotiate, implement, verify, and 
extend agreements between East 
and West. 
In this context, the implemen-
tation and verification monitoring 
of a conventional forces agreement 
will present a major challenge for 
enduring security. NATO must 
make an important contribution. 
I, therefore, invite allied govern-
ments to consider establishing a 
NATO arms control verification 
staff. Verification will remain a 
national responsibility. But such a 
new staff would be able to assist 
member governments in monitoring 
compliance with arms control and 
confidence building measures in 
Europe. A NATO organization of 
this sort could be valuable in 
assisting all allies and coordinating 
the implementation of inspections. 
It could provide a clearinghouse for 
information contributed by national 
governments, perhaps joining with 
collective European efforts through 
the Western European Union. 
As the East-West confrontation 
recedes, and as the prospects for 
East-West cooperation advance, 
other challenges for European and 
Atlantic security will arise. They 
point to NATO's second new 
mission. Regional conflicts-along 
with the proliferation of missiles 
and nuclear, chemical, and biolog-
ical weapons-present growing 
dangers. Intensified NATO consul-
tations on these issues can play an 
important role in forming common 
Western approaches to these 
various threats. 
Third, NATO should also begin 
considering further initiatives the 
West might take, through the CSCE 
process in particular, to build 
economic and political ties with the 
East, to promote respect for human 
rights, to help build democratic 
institutions, and to fashion, consist-
ent with Western security interests, 
a more open environment for East-
West trade and investment. 
Finally, NATO may have its 
greatest and most lasting effect on 
the pattern of change by demon-
strating to the nations of the East a 
fundamentally different approach to 
security. NATO's four decades offer 
a vision of cooperation, not coercion; 
of open borders, not iron curtains. 
The reconciliation of ancient 
enemies, which has taken place 
under the umbrella of NATO's 
collective security, offers the 
nations of Eastern Europe an 
appealing model of international 
relations. 
Whatever security relationships 
the governments of Eastern Europe 
choose, NATO will continue to 
provide Western governments the 
optimal instrument to coordinate 
their efforts at defense and arms 
control and to build a durable 
European order of peace. The 
interests of Eastern Europe and, 
indeed, the interests of the Soviet 
Union will be served by the 
maintenance of a vigorous North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
The Role of the 
European Community 
The future development of the 
European Community will play a 
central role in shaping the new 
Europe. 
The example of Western 
cooperation through the European 
Community has already had a 
dramatic effect on Eastern attitudes 
toward economic liberty. The 
success of this great European 
experiment, perhaps more than any 
other factor, has caused Eastern 
Europeans to recognize that people 
as well as nations cooperate more 
productively when they are free to 
choose. The ballot box and the free 
market are the fundamental 
instruments of choice. 
But the European experiment 
has succeeded not just because it 
has appealed to the enlightened 
self-interest of European producers 
and consumers. This experiment 
has succeeded because the vision of 
its founders encompassed and yet 
transcended the material. This 
experiment has succeeded because 
it also held out the higher goal of 
political as well as economic 
barriers overcome, of a Europe 
united. 
This was the goal of Monnet and 
Schumann. This was the goal 
supported by the United States of 
Marshall and Acheson. This was 
the goal contained in the Treaty of 
Rome and more recently in the 
European Single Act. The United 
States supports this goal today with 
the same energy it did 40 years ago. 
Naturally the United States 
seeks a European Community open 
to cooperation with others. We 
believe Americans will profit from 
access to a single European market, 
just as Europeans have long 
profited from their access to a single 
American market. However, it is 
vital to us all that both these 
markets remain open-indeed, that 
both become even more open. 
As Europe moves toward its goal 
of a common internal market, and 
as its institutions for political and 
security cooperation evolve, the link 
between the United States and the 
European Community will become 
even more important. We want our 
transatlantic cooperation to keep 
pace with European integration and 
institutional reform. 
3 
To this end, we propose that the 
United States and the European 
Community work together to 
achieve, whether in treaty or some 
other form, a significantly 
strengthened set of institutional 
and consultative links. Working 
from shared ideals and common 
values, we face a set of mutual 
challenges--in economics, foreign 
policy, the environment, science, 
and a host of other fields. So it 
makes sense for us to seek to 
fashion our responses together as a 
matter of common course. 
We suggest that our discussions 
about this idea proceed in parallel 
with Europe's efforts to achieve by 
1992 a common internal market so 
that plans for U.S.-EC interaction 
would evolve with changes in the 
Community. 
The United States also en-
courages the European Community 
to continue and expand cooperation 
with the nations of the East. The 
promotion of political and economic 
reforms in the East is a natural 
vocation for the European 
Community. That is why we were 
exceptionally pleased with the 
agreement at the Paris economic 
summit that the European 
Commission should assume a 
special role in the Group of 24 effort 
to promote reform in Poland and 
Hungary. 
The United States has worked 
closely with the European 
Community in mobilizing economic 
and financial support for Hungary 
and Poland. Indeed, the United 
States has authorized almost $1 
billion of assistance to these two 
nations. This week, we look to the 
Group of 24 meeting to move as 
close as possible toward achieving 
the $1 billion stabilization fund 
Poland requested to support its 
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major move toward currency 
convertibility and macroeconomic 
reform. 
That should be just the start of 
our common labor. Poland and 
Hungary have 40 years of economic 
stagnation to overcome, and this 
will take time and our steady 
support. As Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria, and the German 
Democratic Republic undertake 
political and economic reforms 
comparable to those already under 
way in Poland and Hungary, we 
believe the activities of the Group of 
24, centered around the EC, should 
be expanded to support peaceful 
change in these countries as well. 
As the nations of Eastern 
Europe achieve more open political 
and economic systems, they may 
seek new relationships with the 
European Community, with the 
Council of Europe, and with other 
institutions serving both Europe 
and the broader international 
community. In fact, such ties could 
be fundamental to our strategy of 
rebuilding the economies of Eastern 
Europe through private capital and 
initiative: Private investors in 
Eastern Europe will want to know 
that they can sell their products in 
Western markets. 
I am confident that creative new 
arrangements can be devised to 
encourage and sustain the process 
of political and economic reforms in 
the countries of Eastern Europe, 
while at the same time preserving 
the integrity and the vitality of 
existing institutions. We need to 
offer the nations of the East hope, 
opportunities that can be seized as 
they take steps toward democracy 
and economic liberty. Perhaps the 
recent work on an agreement 
between the EC and the six nations 
of the European Free Trade 
Association will set a pattern for 
improved ties with others. 
We see no conflict between the 
process of European integration and 
an expansion of cooperation 
between the European Community 
and its neighbors to the East and 
West. Indeed, we believe that the 
attraction of the European 
Community for the countries of the 
East depends most on its continued 
vitality. And the vitality of the 
economic community depends in 
tum on its continued commitment 
to the goal of a united Europe 
envisaged by its founders-free, 
democratic, and closely linked to its 
North American partners. 
The Helsinki Process 
-The New Role of CSCE 
The institution that brings all the 
nations of the East and West 
together in Europe, the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, is in fact an ongoing 
process launched over 14 years ago 
in Helsinki. There have been 
different perceptions as to the 
functions of this CSCE process. 
Some saw the Helsinki Final Act of 
1975 as a ratification of the status 
quo, the equivalent of a peace treaty 
concluding World War II, and thus 
the legitimization of Europe's 
permanent division. Others, 
however, saw this process as a 
device by which these divisions 
could be overcome. 
The dynamic concept of the 
CSCE process has prevailed. In 
1975, the governments of Eastern 
Europe may not have taken 
seriously their commitments to 
respect a wide range of funda-
mental human rights. Their 
populations did. The standards of 
conduct set by the Helsinki Final 
Act are increasingly being met 
through international pressure and 
domestic ferment. Last month, 
here in Berlin, we witnessed one of 
the proudest achievements of the 
CSCE process as the G.D.R. [East 
Germany] fulfilled its commitment 
to allow its people to travel freely. 
Now it's time for the CSCE 
process to advance further. We can 
look toward filling each of its three 
baskets with new substance. 
First, we can give the security 
basket further content through the 
35-nation negotiations on 
confidence-building measures 
currently underway in Vienna. The 
agreements under consideration 
there should help prevent force, or 
the threat of force, from being used 
again in an effort to intimidate any 
European nation. Apart from 
reducing further the risk of war, 
new confidence-building measures 
can create greater openness. They 
can institutionalize a predictable 
pattern of military interaction, a 
pattern that is difficult to reverse 
and that builds a new basis for 
trust. 
Second, the relatively under-
developed economic basket can 
assume new responsibilities. 
President Bush suggested to 
President Gorbachev at Malta that 
we could breathe new life into this 
CSCE forum by focusing it on the 
conceptual and practical questions 
involved in the transition from 
stalled, planned economies to free, 
competitive markets. When our 
nations meet in Bonn in May of 
next year to discuss economic 
cooperation, I suggest we 
concentrate on this issue. 
Third, the CSCE process has 
made its most distinctive mark in 
the field of human rights. One 
fundamental right, however, has 
not yet been fully institutionalized. 
This is the right for people to 
choose, through regular, free, open, 
multiparty elections, those who will 
govern them. 
This is the ultimate human 
right, the right that secures all 
others. Without free elections, no 
rights can be long guaranteed. 
With free elections, no rights can be 
long denied. 
On May 31, in Mainz, President 
Bush announced a major new 
Helsinki initiative to help end the 
division of Europe. He called for 
free elections and political 
pluralism in all the countries of 
Europe. Now this is coming to 
pass. 
In June, the United States and 
the United Kingdom cosponsored a 
free elections initiative at the CSCE 
human rights meeting in Paris. 
This proposal called on all 35 CSCE 
participating states to allow 
periodic, genuine, and contested 
elections based on universal and 
equal suffrage, by secret ballot, and 
with international observers. 
Individuals would be allowed to 
establish and maintain their own 
political parties in order to ensure 
fully democratic procedures. 
Free elections should now 
become the highest priority in the 
CSCE process. In 1945, Joseph 
Stalin promised free elections and 
self-determination for the peoples of 
Eastern Europe. The fact that 
those elections were not free, and 
that those peoples were not allowed 
to determine their destiny, was a 
fundamental cause of the cold war. 
Now this Stalinist legacy is 
being removed by people 
determined to reclaim their 
birthright to freedom. They should 
not be denied. They will not be 
denied. 
As all or nearly all the CSCE 
states move toward fully func-
tioning representative govern-
ments, I suggest we consider 
another step: We could involve 
parliamentarians more directly in 
CSCE processes, not only as 
observers as at present but perhaps 
through their own meetings. To 
sustain the movement toward 
democracy, we need to reinforce the 
institutions of democracy. 
Germany and Berlin 
In a New Europe 
A new Europe, whole and free, must 
include arrangements that satisfy 
the aspirations of the German 
people and meet the legitimate 
concerns of Germany's neighbors. 
Before the Bundestag on November 
28, Chancellor Kohl laid out an 
approach designed to achieve 
German aspirations in peace and 
freedom. At last week's NATO 
Summit, President Bush reaffirmed 
America's longstanding support for 
the goal of German unification. He 
enunciated four principles that 
guide our policy, and I am pleased 
to note these ideas were 
incorporated into the statement 
issued last week by the leaders of 
the European Community nations 
at Strasbourg. 
• One, self-determination must 
be pursued without prejudice to its 
outcome. We should not at this 
time endorse nor exclude any 
particular vision of unity. 
• Two, unification should occur 
in the context of Germany's 
continued commitment to NATO 
and an increasingly integrated 
European Community and with due 
regard for the legal role and 
responsibilities of the Allied powers. 
• Three, in the interests of 
general European stability, moves 
toward unification must be 
peaceful, gradual, and part of a 
step-by-step process. 
• Four, on the question of 
borders, we should reiterate our 
support for the principles of the 
Helsinki Final Act. 
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President Bush concluded that 
"an end to the unnatural division of 
Europe, and of Germany, must 
proceed in accordance with and be 
based upon the values that are 
becoming universal ideals, as all the 
countries of Europe become part of 
a commonwealth of free nations." 
As an American, I am proud of 
the role my nation has played and 
will continue to play standing with 
you. Yet this very positive course 
will not be easy, nor can it be 
rushed. It must be peaceful. It 
must be democratic. It must 
respect the legitimate concerns of 
all the participants in the new 
Europe. 
As Berlin has stood at the center 
of a divided Europe, so it may stand 
at the center of a Europe whole and 
free-no longer the embattled 
bastion of freedom but instead a 
beacon of hope for a better life. 
A New Europe, 
A New Atlanticism 
My friends, the changes we see 
underway today in the East are a 
source of great hope. But a new era 
brings different concerns for all of 
us. Some are as old as Europe 
itself. Others are themselves the 
new products of change. 
Were the West to abandon the 
patterns of cooperation that we 
have built up over four decades, 
these concerns could grow into 
problems. But the institutions we 
have created-NATO, the European 
Community, and the CSCE 
process-are alive. Rooted in 
democratic values, they fit well with 
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the people power that is shaping 
history's new course. 
Moreimportant,these 
institutions are also flexible and 
capable of adapting to rapidly 
changing circumstances. As we 
adapt, as we update and expand our 
cooperation with each other and 
with the nations of the East, we will 
create a New Europe on the basis of 
a new Atlanticism. 
NATO will remain North 
America's primary link with 
Europe. As arms control and 
political arrangements increasingly 
supplement the still vital military 
component of European security, 
NATO will take on new roles. 
The European Community is 
already an economic pillar of the 
transatlantic relationship. It will 
also take on, perhaps in concert 
with other European institutions, 
increasingly important political 
roles. Indeed, it has already done 
so, as evidenced by the 
Community's coordination of a 
Western effort to support reform in 
Eastern Europe. And as it 
continues to do so, the link between 
the United States and the European 
Community should become 
stronger, the issues we discuss 
more diversified, and our common 
endeavors more important. 
At the same time, the 
substantive overlap between NATO 
and European institutions will 
grow. This overlap must lead to 
synergy, not friction. Better 
communication among European 
and transatlantic institutions will 
become more urgent. 
The CSCE process could become 
the most important forum of East-
West cooperation. Its mandate will 
grow as this cooperation takes root. 
As these changes proceed, as 
they overcome the division of 
Europe, so too will the divisions of 
Germany and Berlin be overcome in 
peace and freedom. 
This fall, a powerful cry went up 
from the huge demonstrations in 
Leipzig, Dresden, and Berlin: "We 
are the people!" the crowds chanted 
at the party that ruled in their 
name. On the other side of the 
globe, Lech Walesa was addressing 
the U.S. Congress, thanking 
America for supporting Polish 
liberty. He began with words 
written 200 years ago, the words 
that open the U.S. Constitution: 
''We the people." 
Between 1789 and 1989, 
between the expressions "We the 
people" and "We are the people," 
runs one of history's deepest 
currents. What the American 
Founding Fathers knew, the people 
of East Germany and Eastern 
Europe now also know-that 
freedom is a blessing but not a gift; 
that the work of freedom is never 
done, and it is never done alone. 
Between the America of"We the 
people" and the Europe of''We are 
the people," there can be no 
division. On this basis, a new 
Atlanticism will flourish, and a new 
Europe will be born. • 
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